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＊
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Trust has been discussed in many social sciences including economics, psychology, and
sociology. However, there is no widely accepted deﬁn itionof trust. Inparticular, there is n o
deﬁnition that can be used for economic analysis. This paper regards trust as expectation and
deﬁnes it using expected utility theory together with concepts such as betrayal premium. In
doing so, it rejects the widely accepted black-and-white view that (un)trustworthy people are
always (un)trustworthy. This paper also discusses various determinants and properties of trust
on the basis of the idea that trust is not simply a matter of intention.
Keywords: Deﬁnitions of Trust, Distrust Premium, Betrayal Premium, Properties of Trust,
Expected Utility Theory
JEL Classiﬁcation: D81, Z13.
I. Introduction
The concept of trust is becoming increasingly important in economics, but it has not yet
beengivena satisfactory de ﬁnition that can be used for economic analysis. An important reason
for this is that it is a concept that is quite remote from mainstream economics or neoclassical
economics.
1 The purpose of this paper is to deﬁne trust using expected utility theory and
discuss its basic determinants and properties.
Neoclassical economics does not explicitly discuss trust, which can be easily seen from the
absence of this concept in it. Correspondingly, few economics textbooks for students mention
trust. One of the basic reasons for this absence is that neoclassical economics assumes contract
completeness. To put it more explicitly, it assumes that all transactions are performed under
suﬃciently detailed contracts and that no individual fails to comply with them.
2
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1 In this paper, neoclassical economics stands for the general equilibrium theory developed by Arrow and Debreu
(1954) and, in particular, by Debreu (1959).
2 Neoclassical economics also implicitly assumes the completeness of the law. Namely, it assumes that the law is
suﬃciently detailed and all individuals comply with it. In the following, this paper will concentrate on contract
completeness and will not refer to law completeness.In essence, neoclassical economics assumes that all individuals are trustworthy in the sense
that they perfectly comply with contracts and the law. Hence, it virtually assumes that all
economic agents can and do perfectly trust other individuals as well. Indeed, since the
neoclassical economic paradigm does not have the police or courts, it is theoretically necessary
for it to assume that all individuals are perfectly trustworthy in the above sense.
In contrast, whether individuals are trustworthy or not is a serious problem in the real
world because it has few complete contracts, which can be understood from the existence of
room for behavioral discretioninman y tran sactioncases. The reasonfor the prevalen ce of
incomplete contracts is that it is prohibitively costly to make complete contracts because of the
transaction costs. For instance, it is impossible in the case of a labor contract to specify how to
work each minute of each day and what punishment to apply when the work is not done
properly.
As mentioned above, an incomplete contract tends to generate discretionary behavior in the
parties involved in it. This fact in turn generates interdependence or a game situation among
them. This game is very likely to be the prisonerʼs dilemma game, and pursuit of self-interest
will not lead to eﬃciency. Thus, it becomes very important whether or not oneʼs transaction
partner will behave ethically or as promised, namely trustworthily. This logic shows why
trustworthiness (or trust) is economically important in transactions.
Trust and trustworthiness are important not only in human relations with certain formal
con tracts, but also inother relation s without them. Anexample of the former is humanrelation s
within organizations and an example of the latter is neighborhood relations. Trust and
trustworthiness are economically important because they tend to increase eﬃciency signiﬁcantly
by aiding cooperation among those involved and by reducing transaction costs such as
monitoring costs. Thus, there are strong reasons why trust and trustworthiness are indispensable
inman y humanrelation ships.
The structure of this paper is as follows: SectionII discusses some typical de ﬁnitions of
trust that have beenproposed insocial scien ces. SectionIII provides my basic de ﬁnitions of
trust usin g probability. SectionIV elaborates them onthe basis of expected utility theory.
SectionV exten ds the de ﬁnitions in Section IV by introducing the concept of betrayal aversion.
Section VI examines the performance of my deﬁnitions using speciﬁc utility functions and
distribution functions for the trusteeʼs behaviors. Section VII considers basic determinants of the
degree of trust. SectionVIII discusses some importan t properties of trust that have beenpoin ted
out by many trust researchers. Section IX inquires into the meaning of intention involved in
trustworthiness. Section X concludes this paper.
II. Typical Deﬁnitions of Trust
There is virtually no deﬁnition of trust proposed by economists, which can be conﬁrmed
by searching for references in EconLit using ʻtrustʼ and ʻdeﬁnitionʼ (or ʻdeﬁningʼ or ʻdeﬁneʼ)a s
keywords. Most deﬁnitions that are currently referred to in social sciences are those proposed
by sociologists or psychologists. Before discussing my own deﬁnition, I would like to introduce
and criticize some typical deﬁnitions proposed by sociologists and psychologists. They can be
classiﬁed into two diﬀerent categories: those that regard trust as behavior and those that regard
it as expectation.
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deﬁnes individual Aʼs trust inin dividual B as A ʼs behavior consisting of actions that (a)
increase Aʼs vulnerability (b) to B whose behavior is not under Aʼs con trol (c) ina situationin
which the penalty (disutility) A suﬀers if B abuses that vulnerability is greater than the beneﬁt
(utility) A gains if B does not.
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The following example promotes understanding of this deﬁnition. A parent (A) exhibits
trusting behavior if A hires a baby-sitter (B) to go to see a movie. This action signiﬁcantly
increases Aʼs vulnerability, since A cannot control Bʼs behavior after leaving Aʼs house. If B
abuses that vulnerability, the penalty may be a tragedy that may adversely aﬀect the rest of Aʼs
life; if B does not, the beneﬁt will be the pleasure of seeing the movie.
Chiba (1997) proposes a similar deﬁnition. He claims that individual A trusts individual B
(a) if A chooses a risky action( b) in a situation with essential uncertainty about Bʼs behavior,
(g) anticipating that B will behave favorably towards A. Conditions (a)a nd( b) here nearly
correspond to conditions (a) and (b) respectively in Deutschʼsd e ﬁnition.
These two typical deﬁnitions have several shortcomings. First, in the real world, trust does
not necessarily relate to the behavior of the truster toward the trustee or increase the trusterʼs
vulnerability to the trustee. For example, it is likely that A trusts judges even if A is not
considering whether or not to use the courts. Another example is that A tells individual C that
B is trustworthy or that A trusts B. In this case, A does not usually increase his vulnerability to
Bb ys a y i ngs o .
Thus, trust is a concept that is generally diﬀerent from the behavior or vulnerability of the
truster. It should be added that trust exists evenif con dition(c) inDeutsch ʼsd e ﬁnition is not
satisﬁed, though it is likely to be satisﬁed in many trust relations.
Chibaʼsd e ﬁnition does not specify what causes uncertainty about Bʼs behavior. He
probably considers the uncertainty A faces regarding Bʼs intention, but the above deﬁnition can
contain other uncertainty factors as well such as Bʼs competence and the weather, which will
aﬀect Bʼs behavior together with Bʼs intention. This is also the case in Deutschʼsd e ﬁnition.
Another problem with Chibaʼsd e ﬁnition is that the true meaning of favorable behavior is
not clear because it has many diﬀerent levels in the real world including minimally favorable
behavior, fairly favorable behavior, and perfectly favorable behavior. Similarly, there are many
levels in the penalty and the beneﬁt of Deutschʼsd e ﬁnition.
Inaddition , it is tautological to talk about ʻa risky actionʼ in( a)a ndʻuncertainty ʼ in( b)i n
Chibaʼsd e ﬁnition. Moreover, since Chiba presupposes essential uncertainty about Bʼs behavior,
he faces the serious problem of being unable to deﬁne perfect trust (with no risk). Most trust
studies seem to consider perfect trust as the ideal, but this deﬁnition cannot deﬁne such a state.
Deutschʼsd e ﬁnition also has the same problem.
Next, we discuss some typical deﬁnitions that regard trust as expectation. Sako (1992)
gives the following deﬁnition: Trust is a state of mind, an expectation held by one trading
partner about another, that the other behaves or responds in a predictable and mutually
acceptable manner.
This deﬁnition does not escape serious shortcomings, either. For instance, it does not
consider how the degree of trust changes in accordance with a variety of possible behaviors or
responses of the other partner. If the expected behavior is only slightly less acceptable than a
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3 See also Zand (1972).speciﬁc level, is the other trading partner completely untrustworthy? Since there are in general
many diﬀerent possible levels regarding the other partnerʼs behavior, a deﬁnition of trust needs
to take this fact into consideration.
On the other hand, Lazric and Lorenz (1998) emphasize the following three conditions as
the basis for deﬁning trust. (i) Trust is identiﬁed with anagen t ʼs beliefs rather thanwith his
behavior or actions. (ii) Trust refers to beliefs about the likely behavior of another, or others,
which matter for the trusterʼs decision making. (iii) Trust pertains to situations where the
complexity of the relationship, or the fact that it is marked by unanticipated contingencies,
precludes having recourse to complete contingent contracts with third-party enforcement.
This idea also has some shortcomings. Although it deals with beliefs rather than behavior,
those beliefs relate only to the trusterʼs decision to interact with the trustee. I mentioned above
that there are diﬀerent types of trust in the real world. In addition, the above idea does not
show how those beliefs are expressed.
4
III. Preliminary Deﬁnitions
I would now like to discuss my own deﬁnitions of trust. I ﬁrst proposed some deﬁnitions
inJapan ese inArai (2000). Here, I would like to discuss them ﬁrst and then propose extended
versions. According to the above classiﬁcationof de ﬁnitions of trust, my deﬁnitions belong to
the latter, i.e., I regard trust as expectation. In the following, I will discuss these deﬁnitions step
by step from the simplest and most intuitive to the more general ones.
The simplest and most intuitive deﬁnition is the following.
Deﬁnition 1: Individual A trusts individual B if A expects B to keep Bʼs promise or to comply
with what is socially considered to be ethical (when B says nothing).
An important idea behind this deﬁnition is that trust needs to be deﬁn ed inrelationto a
certainethical criterion , which is either B ʼs promise or what is socially considered to be ethical.
Since human beings do not always make promises regarding their future behavior, what is
socially con sidered to be ethical becomes the ethical criterionwhenn o promise is made. This
deﬁnition clearly shows that trust is regarded as a kind of expectation. It should be noted that
this expectationmay be purely subjective, n amely, that evenif A trusts B, in dividual C may
not trust B. Moreover, it is likely that A trusts B in one respect but does not in another.
It canhappenthat some people make un ethical promises like those ingan gs or cliques
within organizations. If the promise in the above deﬁnition is unethical, trust can be established
even about unethical matters. If one does not want this feature to arise in a deﬁnition of trust,
one can distinguish between ethical and unethical trust. Of course, ethics can vary across
societies, so ethical trust insociety X may be un ethical insociety Y. Less importan tly, it can
happeneveninthe same society or group that ethical judgmen ts di ﬀer among diﬀerent
members.
5
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4 See also Ring and Van de Ven (1992), Barney and Hansen (1994), and Zaheer et al. (1998). They treat trust as
expectation as well and share similar shortcomings.
5 It is also likely to happenwithingan gs or cliques that evenif their members behave un ethically without makin g
unethical promises, trust can be established. This is because these groups have socially unethical norms. This kind ofThere is a defect inDe ﬁnition 1. Do we have to say that A does not trust B if there is
0.1% probability that B does not keep his promise? This defect can be overcome simply by
introducing probability as the following second deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2: Individual A trusts individual B if A believes with a high probability that B will
keep Bʼs promise or comply with what is socially considered to be ethical (when B says
nothing).
To be rigorous, ʻtrustsʼ inthe above de ﬁnition should be replaced by ʻhighly trustsʼ in
correspondence with ʻa high probabilityʼ, but since ʻtrustsʼ implies ʻhighly trustsʼ inmost daily
conversations, this deﬁnition has followed the ʻdaily lifeʼ meaning. For the same reason as
above, this probability canbe purely subjective.
This deﬁnition shows that trust is not a matter of black and white, but a matter of degree.
Many studies regard trust as a black-and-white problem: They consider either that A trusts B
completely or that A does not trust B at all. Similarly, they assume either that B is completely
trustworthy or that B is completely untrustworthy. In fact, the researchers whose deﬁnitions of
trust have beendiscussed above have this black-an d-white view of trust implicitly because they
do not use probability in their deﬁnitions.
It should be added that Deﬁnition 2 is consistent with the deﬁnition of trust used in
engineering. More speciﬁcally, trust is deﬁned in engineering as the probability with which the
item inquestionperforms the work required ina givencon ditiondurin g a speci ﬁed period.
An example will clarify the meaning of Deﬁn ition2. WhenA makes a decisionas to
whether to lend money to B, Aʼs degree of trust inB about this particular matter is expressed
by the probability with which A believes that B will repay A the debt (with interest). This
example suggests that the degree of trust depends on a variety of factors including the amount
of money to be lent. A may trust B when A is considering lending one thousand US dollars,
but may not in the case of a hundred thousand dollars. This paper considers important
determinants of trust in Section VII.
IV. Deﬁnitions Using Expected Utility Theory
Deﬁnition 2 is suﬃciently general to be applied to many cases, but it is not fully general
because it may happeninthe above example that B return s half or two thirds of the amoun t B
is obliged to return. In other words, the number of Bʼs possible actions is more than two and
the above-mentioned ethical criterion is partially satisﬁed insome of them.
This defect canbe overcome by utilizin g expected utility theory. Inorder to show it,
suppose A is making a decision as to whether to lend money to individual B as above. A




>sk+1>…>sn/0, and s0 is the full amount to be returned including interest. Let u be Aʼs von
Neumann-Morgenstein utility function and let w+si be Aʼs wealth whenB return s si.T h e n,A ʼs
expected utility of lending the money is expressed as
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Anidea for a n ew deﬁn itionis to use this expected utility level inrelationto the upper
limit of perfect trust and the lower limit of no trust. The upper limit stands for the case in
which A believes that B will return s0 with certainty and Aʼs (expected) utility becomes equal
to u (w+s0) . On the other hand, the lower limit stands for the case in which A believes that B
will return sn or nothing with certainty and Aʼs (expected) utility becomes equal to u (w+sn).
This idea will generate the degree of Aʼs trust inB, which canbe expressed by measurin g
how close the expected utility inexpression(1) is to the upper limit. Inorder to compute it, let
us introduce the following expression:
tu(w+s0)+(1,t)u(w+sn), (2)
where 0CtC1. This expressioncanbe in terpreted as A ʼs expected utility inthe case where he
expects that B will returnthe full amoun t with probability t and nothing with probability 1,t.
According to Deﬁnition 2, the value of t measures Aʼs degree of trust inB whenB has on ly
those two options.
Equating expression (1) with expression (2) and solving the equation for t generates the







Obviously, this measure is invariant with respect to any aﬃne transformation of u. Hence, this
degree of trust is unique under Bʼs same preferences. It is clear that t1 inexpression(3) satisﬁes
condition 0Ct1C1. The case of t1/1 indicates a situation where A perfectly trusts B, while the
case of t1/0 indicates a situation where A does not trust B at all.
Summing up, the above discussion has produced the following third deﬁnition of trust.
Deﬁnition 3: Suppose A is making a decision as to whether to interact with B. A believes that
his wealth will become w+si with probability pi inaccordan ce with action i B chooses against
A from n+1 possible actions (i/0, 1, 2,…, n), where w+s0 is Aʼs wealth whenB perfectly
keeps Bʼs promise or perfectly complies with what is socially considered to be ethical, sn is Aʼs
wealth whenB behaves most poorly to A, an d w+sk>w+sk+1. Under these circumstances, Aʼs
degree of trust canbe expressed by expression(3).
Figure 1 illustrates the meaning of this third deﬁnition of trust. The denominator on the
right-han d side inexpression(3) equals distan ce CG inthe ﬁgure, while the numerator equals




Anobservationof Figure 1 suggests that there canbe an other de ﬁnition of trust or another
way to express Aʼs degree of trust in B. In order to see this, let us consider the meaning of
distance EF. It canbe in terpreted as the loss A expects whenhe in teracts with B, because A
believes that B is untrustworthy to that extent. This distance can be called Aʼs distrust premium
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maximal possible distrust premium.













This gives the following fourth deﬁnition of trust.
Deﬁnition 4: Under the same circumstances as in Deﬁnition 3, Aʼs trust inB canbe expressed
as expression(6).
The idea for Deﬁnition 4 is that the degree of trust is measured by how small the distrust
premium is relative to the maximal level of the distrust premium. Note that the idea for the
deﬁnition of distrust premium is diﬀerent from that for risk (insurance) premium. Although the
latter is deﬁned as the distance between the expected return and the certainty equivalent, the





piu(w+si)). I think this is quite natural because the degree of trust needs to
be measured inrelationto a certainethical criterionas men tion ed above. It should be added
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FIG 1that the degree of trust expressed in expression (6) is also invariant with respect to any aﬃne
transformation of u.
Here, I would like to propose a slightly more general deﬁn itionof trust. Inthe above cases
of this section, Bʼs choice of action i uniquely determines Aʼs wealth w+si or welfare u(w+si),
but this does not hold in some cases in the real world. For instance, even if a doctor chooses a
speciﬁc treatment, the patientʼs welfare canalso be aﬀected by other factors such as B ʼs
physical condition, Bʼs genetic or acquired factors, the condition of the medical equipment, the
weather, the assistantsʼ work, and so on. Similarly, even if a tourist guide has chosen a speciﬁc
service, the welfare of the tourist who hires him also depends on the weather, traﬃc conditions,
and crowdedness of the sightseeing spots, and so on.
These stochastic factors can be incorporated to generate a slightly more general deﬁnition
of trust than the above. Here, I consider generalization of Deﬁnition 3 only. As above let pi
denote the probability with which A believes that B will choose action i (0CpiC1). Under the
circumstances considered here, Aʼs welfare depends not only on Bʼs action, but also on other
stochastic factors. Let xij denote the state that will arise with probability pij whenB chooses
action i (j/0, 1, 2, …, m). Number of states m candiﬀer from actionto actiononthe part of
B, but we assume here that it is the same without loss of gen erality. Inexpression(3), xij is Aʼs
wealth with xij/w+si for all j. A more general case is considered here.
As above, let action 0 be the best for A, action 1 be the second best, and so on. The











Inother words, the probability distributioncorrespon din g to action k dominates that















This is an extension of expression (3). Hence, the following new deﬁn itioncanbe proposed.
Deﬁnition 5: Whenthere are risk factors other thanB ʼs action, Aʼs trust inB canbe expressed
by expression(8).
V. Deﬁnitions of Trust with Betrayal Aversion
The deﬁnitions of trust discussed in the previous sections treated risks generated by human
interactions in the same manner as those generated by asocial factors such as weather and
earthquakes. Inrecen t years, several researchers emphasize the di ﬀerences between the two.
They include Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Bohnet and Zeckhauser
(2004), Engelmann and Strobel (2004), Hong and Bohnet (2007), Bohnet et al. (2008), and
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These researchers distinguish the two types of risk by introducing the concept of betrayal
aversion, which means that individuals are less willing to accept betrayal risks. Since risks
inherent in trust intrinsically contain betrayal risks, they claim that those risks need to be
treated diﬀerently from asocial risks.
Fehr (2009) says that people are more willing to take risk when facing a given probability
of bad luck than to trust when facing an identical probability of being cheated. The idea behind
the concept of betrayal aversion is the existence of special distaste for being a sucker or being
exploited by untrustworthy partners. In many cases, betrayal aversion means that people have a
dislike of non-reciprocated trust.
Bohnet et al. (2008) point to two sources of betrayal aversion. First, the trusteeʼs decision
determines not only the trusterʼsp a y o ﬀ, but also the trusteeʼs, inwhich the truster is highly
interested. Second, elements beyond mere outcome-based preferences are likely to enter the
utility function. Such elements include the psychological costs inherent in being betrayed.
Betrayal aversioncanbe in corporated in to the trust de ﬁnitions discussed above. In order to
do so, we start with Deﬁnition 3 and extend it by introducing the concept of betrayal premium.
Assume that Aʼs utility equals u (w+si,bi) whenB chooses action i, where biB0 denotes
Aʼs betrayal premium and 0/b0Cb1C…Cbn. This assumptionmean s that whenA faces a
trust problem, his welfare depends not only upon his pecuniary state, but also upon his
psychological state generated by Bʼs action. Note that the betrayal premium increases as the
size of Bʼs betrayal becomes larger, though the premium equals zero inthe case where B
perfectly keeps his promise or perfectly complies with what is socially considered to be ethical.
Using the concept of betrayal premium, Deﬁnition 3 can be extended to the following.
Deﬁnition 6: Whenin dividual A has betrayal premium biB0 for individual Bʼs action i under








As before, Figure 2 shows the graphical meaning of Deﬁnition 6. Because of the existence
of betrayal aversion , the distrust premium here is larger thanthat inFigure 1. Inparticular, the
maximal possible distrust premium where B chooses action n equals distance HK,w h i c hi s
larger thandistrust premium DG by the amount of betrayal premium HL.





Another new deﬁnition using the betrayal premium can also be made following the idea of













Therefore, we have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 7: Under the same circumstances as in Deﬁnition 6, Aʼs trust inB canbe expressed
as expression(12).
VI. Numerical Examples of Degree of Trust
This section provides several numerical examples of degree of trust using some of the
deﬁnitions of trust given in the previous sections. We use Deﬁnitions 3, 4, 6, and 7 for the
examples here, because they are the representative deﬁnitions of this paper. The primary
purpose of considering the examples here is to examine whether these deﬁnitions have nice
properties.
The examples use the following special utility functions:
u(x)/,e
-ax a>0 and (13)
v(x)/,x
1-r r>1, (14)
where x denotes the amount of wealth of individual A or the truster. The utility function in
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FIG 2expression (13) exhibits the property of constant absolute risk aversion a inthe Arrow-Pratt
sense, and the larger the level of a, the larger the level of absolute risk aversion. On the other
hand, the utility function in expression (14) exhibits the property of constant relative risk
aversion r, and the larger the level of r, the larger the level of relative risk aversion. In the
following, we consider the cases of a/1, a/2, and a/3 for the utility fun ctioninexpression
(13), and r/2, r/3, and r/4 for the utility fun ctioninexpression(14).
Let n/2, w/8, s0/2, s1/1, and s2/0. Then, w+s0/10, w+s1/9, and w+s2/8. The
probability distributionof A ʼs wealth whenB is expected to pay back si with probability pi is
shown by the following notation (i/0, 1, 2):
d/{w+s0, w+s1, w+s2: p0, p1, p2}. (15)
This means that A believes w+si will occur with probability pi.
For Deﬁnitions 3 and 4 we consider the following three probability distributions:
d1/{10, 9, 8: 0.8, 0.1, 0.1}, (16)
d2/{10, 9, 8: 0.7, 0.2, 0.1}, and (17)
d3/{10, 9, 8: 0.6, 0.2, 0.2}. (18)
These example distributions imply that A trusts B more in the case of d1 thaninthe case of d2,
and more in the case of d2 thaninthe case of d3.
Table 1 shows degrees of trust computed usin g the utility fun ctioninexpression(13). It
canbe seenthat the degree of trust is larger inthe case of d1 (d2) thaninthe case of d2 (d3) for
both t1 and t2 or for both Deﬁnitions 3 and 4 at each level of a. Onthe other han d, as A ʼs
degree of risk aversion increases, his degree of trust increases in the case of t1 or Deﬁnition 3
and decreases in the case of t2 or Deﬁnition 4. Hence, Deﬁnition 4 seems to have a better
property as far as these numerical examples are concerned.
Next, we compute the degree of trust by introducing betrayal aversion. In order to see the
eﬀects of the magnitude of betrayal aversion, we consider two diﬀerent cases.
Inthe ﬁrst case, we assume that b0/0, b1/0.5, and b3/1. Then, we have the following


























TABLE 1. DEGREES OF TRUSTdistributions of Aʼs real wealth that takes account of his betrayal premiums:
d4/{10, 8.5, 7: 0.8, 0.1, 0.1}, (19)
d5/{10, 8.5, 7: 0.7, 0.2, 0.1}, and (20)
d6/{10, 8.5, 7: 0.6, 0.2, 0.2}. (21)
Inthe secon d case, we assume that b0 /0, b1 /1, and b2 /2. The corresponding
distributionof A ʼs real wealth thenbecomes the followin g:
d7/{10, 8, 6: 0.8, 0.1, 0.1}, (22)
d8/{10, 8, 6: 0.7, 0.2, 0.1}, and (23)
d9/{10, 8, 6: 0.6, 0.2, 0.2}. (24)
Table 2 and Table 3 show the computation results for the ﬁrst and second cases,




















































TABLE 3. DEGREES OF TRUST WITH BETRAYAL AVERSION 2respectively. Although the degrees of trust for t1 inTable 2 are larger thanthe correspon din g
values inTable 1, those for t2 are smaller. Hence, t2 or Deﬁn ition4 againbehaves better as a
deﬁnition of trust. A similar relationship exists between Tables 2 and 3.
The above degrees of trust were computed using the utility function in expression (13).
The computationresults for the utility fun ctioninexpression(14) are showninTables 4, 5, an d
6. They reveal properties quite similar to those observed inTables 1, 2, an d 3.
These observations suggest that degree of trust t2 has many desirable properties. Although
t1 has the property of reducing the degree of trust for probability distributions with more
distrust, its value in creases whenthe degree of risk aversionin creases or whenthe betrayal
premium increases. Therefore, Deﬁnitions 4 and 7 seem to be the best deﬁnitions as far as the
above numerical examples are concerned.




















































TABLE 5. DEGREES OF TRUST WITH BETRAYAL AVERSION 1VII. Determinants of Trust
If trust is deﬁned as in the previous sections, an interesting question that naturally arises is
what the main factors are determining the degree of trust. This section considers this question
mainly using the above hypothetical case in which A is making a decision as to whether to lend
money to B. In this case, Aʼs degree of trust inB depen ds above all uponthe followin g ﬁve
categories of factors: (I) the social environment, (II) Bʼs characteristics, (III) the relationship
between A and B, (IV) the characteristics of the object regarding which A trusts B, and (V) Aʼs
characteristics. Below, I would like to discuss in detail these factors one by one.
First, it may be obvious to many people that Aʼst r u s ti nBi sa ﬀected by the social
environment such as the culture, the legal system, and other characteristics of the society and/or
organization to which A and B belong. A would not expect the money he has lent to be
returned with a high probability if the culture does not attach much importance to defaulting on
payment of debt. It is clear that the probability of repayment also depends on the legal system,
i.e., the provisions of the law, how they are applied, the judicial system, the costs of using the
courts, and so on. If the members of the society and/or organization to which A and B belong
are individualistic and few righteous third persons (friends, relatives, colleagues, etc.) intervene
inthe dispute betweenA an d B, B is expected to be less likely to try to repay the mon ey,
resulting in Aʼs low trust inB.
Secondly, Aʼs trust inB also depen ds uponB ʼs characteristics such as his values,
personality, earnings, economic conditions, competence, and so forth. It is obvious that these
factors aﬀect the probability with which B will returnthe mon ey. Though the society ʼs culture
inﬂuences the values of its members, the extent of inﬂuence varies across individuals, that is,
there is individual diversity in the extent to which the culture is internalized.
Thirdly, the social relationship between A and B obviously aﬀects the probability with
which B will return the money. If they are close friends, the probability must be high. If the
relationship is expected to continue for a long period of time, the probability must also be high.
The probability of repayment is higher in the case where the two individuals are neighbors than
inthe case where they live hun dreds of kilometers apart. Similarly, the probability of


























TABLE 6. DEGREES OF TRUST WITH BETRAYAL AVERSION 2repaymen t is higher inthe case where they belon g to the same organ izationthaninthe case
w h e r et h e yb e l o ngt od i ﬀerent organizations.
Fourthly, the characteristics of the object regarding which A trusts or distrusts B are
important determinants of Aʼs degree of trust inB. The most importan t characteristic inthe case
of lending money is the amount of money to be returned. In general, the smaller the amount,
the larger the probability of repayment, although the probability of repayment may be low for
very small amounts such as a few dollars. When repayment is due may be another important
characteristic. Important characteristics vary from case to case. In a diﬀerent example where a
boss is thinking about telling his subordinate to do a task, the diﬃculty of the task is a very
important characteristic.
Fifthly, since the probabilities used to deﬁne trust are purely subjective as discussed above,
Aʼs characteristics aﬀect his trust in B as well. For instance, Aʼs family background strongly
aﬀects his expectations towards others. More generally, what experiences A has had in his life
inﬂuences those probabilities. Older people might trust others less than younger people because
the perceptiveness of the former is greater. In addition, as discussed in the previous sections,
Aʼs risk aversionan d betrayal aversiona ﬀect his degree of trust.
VIII. Basic Properties of Trust
This section reexamines a few important properties of trust that have been pointed out by
trust researchers and shows that many researchers have logically wrong ideas about trust
concerning those properties. More speciﬁcally, this section ﬁrst criticizes the widely (and
implicitly) accepted view that society is made up of those who are trustworthy and those who
are untrustworthy. It then criticizes the view that trust studies should focus on the intention
involved in behavior by eliminating all other factors that generate desirable behavior such as
competence and external pressures.
The ﬁrst of these two views claims essentially that those who are trustworthy are always
completely trustworthy and that those who are untrustworthy are always completely
untrustworthy. This is a black-and-white view of trust. It seems that this same view is common
to all researchers whose deﬁnitions of trust were discussed in Section II. Interestingly, this view
will lead logically to the unwanted conclusion that studying trust is worthless. There are two
reasons for this.
One reason is that if trustworthy people were always trustworthy and untrustworthy people
were always untrustworthy, a low-cost experiment could be used to tell whether or not any
particular individual is trustworthy. For instance, a prisonerʼs dilemma game could be used in
anexperimen t to see if that personchooses the cooperative strategy.
6 If he chooses it, he will
be trustworthy in any situation no matter how large his beneﬁt from cheating will be. If this
method is slightly ﬁctitious, individual A could use an actual situation involving trust with a
small amount of possible loss. If B behaves trustworthily in this instance, A can trust him
perfectly inan y trust situationn o matter how large the possible loss will be. Inthis way, it
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6 Inaccordan ce with my de ﬁnitions of trust, individual A may need to obtain from individual B a promise that B
will be cooperative. However, this is not necessary in most cases because what is considered to be ethical in most
societies is to behave cooperatively ina situationlike the prison er ʼs dilemma game.would be very easy and virtually costless to distinguish trustworthy from untrustworthy people.
The other reason is that it would be impossible to promote trust by any means if
untrustworthy people were always untrustworthy. An important purpose of studying trust is to
devise ways to promote trust. In fact, many people and organizations in the real world are
trying to promote it by maintaining good human relations, exhibiting leadership, establishing
institutions that foster it, and so on. However, the above view essentially regards all these
eﬀorts as useless.
If a low-cost experiment could be used to tell whether or not any particular individual is
trustworthy, trust would actually become a matter of certainty, not uncertainty. Hence, the most
important element of trust would disappear if the above black-and-white view were accepted.
On the other hand, if it were impossible to promote trust by any means, trust would not be an
object of economic analysis because it is of no use allocating resources or expending eﬀorts to
promote trust.
All these mean that studying trust would be worthless if the above black-and-white view
of trust were accepted. This con clusioninturnreveals the importan ce of de ﬁning and analyzing
trust using probability.
Next, we examine another basic property of trust. That is, we consider whether the
elements of competence and social pressures can be eliminated from the trust concept to have
only intention in it. Some trust researchers such as Barber (1983) and Yamagishi (1998) claim
that lack of competence may prevent a trustworthy individual from behaving trustworthily. In
other words, evenif anin dividual behaves like anun trustworthy person , they claim, he may be
trustworthy if his competence is low.
When B has borrowed money from A and promised to return it, B may fail to keep it
simply because he is not competent enough to make money, even though he tries hard to return
it. The above researchers regard B in this case as trustworthy because he has the intention of
returning the money. They claim that only intention should be the object of analysis regarding
trust. According to this view, a competent individual is not necessarily trustworthy even if he
always keeps his promise.
The above researchers use similar logic to eliminate external pressures such as social or
legal pressures from the trust concept. According to this logic, an individual who behaves well
when he faces social or legal pressures against violation cannot be judged to be trustworthy
because he may simply be avoiding sanctions by doing so. Sanctions may be implemented by
some members of the community he belongs to, by some coworkers, by the law, or by
someone else.
A special kind of social pressure arises when the trading partner has strong bargaining
power. This holds, for example, inthe relation ship betweena car assembler an d a parts
producer and that between a department store and a supplier. In this relationship the bargaining
power on the part of the car assembler and the department store acts as social pressure because
it can be used to terminate the relationship when a somewhat undesirable response is observed
onthe part of the parts producer or the supplier. Accordin g to the above view, a parts producer
and a supplier cannot be said to be trustworthy even if they always deliver high-quality
products on the appointed date, because they are under pressure.
What is common among these ideas is the view that analysis of trust should focus on
intention by eliminating all other factors that generate desirable behavior. According to this
view, trustworthy behavior should be chosen voluntarily without any external pressures. It may
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interesting questions from analysis. Hence, I do not agree with this view. Below, I would like
to expand on the reasons.
Firstly, there are many determinants of trust as discussed above and eliminating only
competence and external pressures does not result in extracting intention. Eliminating them
does not eliminate the inﬂuences of (a part of) the human relations between A and B, the
culture of the society and/or the organization A and B belong to, and Aʼs experiences,
perceptiveness, and risk aversion.
For instance, whether A and B are in a long-term relationship aﬀects trust and cooperative
behavior as the theories of repeated games suggest, but it is independent of competence and
external pressures. So is the eﬀect of organizational cultural aspects such as smooth
communication among coworkers. Game experiments by Dawes et al. (1977) and van de Kragt
et al. (1983) demonstrate that pre-play communication signiﬁcantly increases cooperation. Arai
(1995) and Arai (2005) demonstrate that the experimenterʼs persuasionof players to cooperate
also increases cooperation. Since pre-play communication and persuasion do not involve
sanctions, they can be considered to be independent of external pressures.
Secondly, it is conceptually and technically impossible in almost all cases to eliminate
competence and external pressures from the trust concept to extract only intention. For instance,
what is the minimal income or wealth for a person who has borrowed twenty thousand US
dollars and is regarded as competent enough to return the money? Most people in advanced
countries can return that debt by cutting their food expenditure by one third for a few years
without damaging their health (while actually improving it). Is such an act within or beyond
their competence? No one seems to be able to answer this question. In fact, the above-
mentioned researchers themselves are unlikely to be able to answer it. I think that they use the
word ʻcompetenceʼ ambiguously and that they are unable to deﬁne it. If so, they cannot
eliminate it theoretically from the trust concept. It is easy to use the word ʻcompetenceʼ, but it is
diﬃcult to specify the conditions that generate competence. Many kinds of competence are
beyond deﬁnition.
It should be added that a trustworthy individual does not borrow money that he is unable
to return. Neither does he accept work he is unable to complete by the appointed time.
Trustworthy people make promises and accept orders in accordance with their competence, so it
is unnecessary to eliminate the competence factor from the trust concept.
IX. The Essence of Intention
It needs to be noted that intention is not necessarily independent of social or legal
pressures. Ethics is internalized within human beings through socialization, which is nothing
but a result of social and legal pressures. Many people might think that they would not commit
homicide even if the law did not have punishments for it, but there is no doubt that the law
promotes internalization of ethics. Moreover, there is no individual in the world who
internalizes all ethics, so conscience works well only under social and legal pressures.
Incidentally, those researchers who have the above-mentioned black-and-white view of trust
need to believe that there are many people who have so completely internalized ethics that they
behave ethically under any conditions in real society. This is too simplistic and unrealistic a
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For the reasons given above, it is diﬃcult to conceptualize trust that has eliminated social
and legal pressures to extract only intention. What the above researchers regard as intention is
very likely to be the result of psychological and cultural pressures through law and religion on
the one hand and the pressures of the communities such as organizations and religious groups
on the other. Many of the behaviors that are considered to be based on internal motivation are
actually nothing but reactions to such invisible pressures. Indeed, even most behaviors that are
considered to derive from free will are inﬂuenced by culture, although the degree of inﬂuence
varies across individuals.
The view that deals with only intention in trust studies naturally has to accept the idea that
behaviors consistent with self-interest are not trustworthy behaviors, because the above-
mentioned behaviors whereby sanctions are avoided are equivalent to the pursuit of self-
interest. As shown below, this idea also has a serious theoretical problem, which is another
reasonI disagree with this view.
At ﬁrst sight, trust behaviors deriving from intention might seem quite diﬀerent from those
deriving from self-interest. There are many cases, however, in which it is diﬃcult to distinguish
between them. Indeed, if one tries to make a distinction, one is led to a strange conclusion.
The problem of reputationclari ﬁes the point. In many cases, behaviors that generate good
reputations are considered to be trustworthy behaviors. On the other hand, since individuals are
fond of good reputations about themselves, behaviors that generate good reputations are
consistent with self-interest. Therefore, if behaviors consistent with self-interest were not
trustworthy behaviors, desirable behaviors that generate good reputations would not be
trustworthy behaviors against the normal sense of human beings.
An interesting example is the following: Suppose that an individual has been behaving
trustworthily, which has given him a good reputation, but that he himself has not heard of it.
Suppose further that his reputation has become so enormous that one day he hears of it. Then,
evenif he behaves inthe same way as before from that day on , he is con scious of his
reputation. According to the above idea, his behaviors from that day on are not trustworthy
behaviors because they are consistent with his self-interest. The exact same behavior is
regarded as trustworthy when he does not know of his reputation but as untrustworthy when he
knows of it. This is a very strange claim.
As another example, suppose that a large well-known corporation is providing conscien-
tious care to its customers. It does not commit any injustice and actively provides its customers
with all useful information. This kind of corporate behavior is not trustworthy behavior
according to the above view, because it is likely to contribute to that corporationʼs proﬁts. This
is also a strange claim.
We have already mentioned that what is generally called trust cannot be determined only
by intention, competence, or external pressures. However, the concept of ʻconditionsʼ proposed
by Nooteboom (2002) is so general that it seems to include many determinants of trust. In
contrast to the above-mentioned black-and-white view of trust, he claims that trust is
determined by several conditions. This claim is closer to my view of trust, since those
conditions can include the culture of the society that A and B belong to and (a part of) their
social relations as conditions determining trust. However, even if this concept is introduced,
there are still other determinants of trust such as Aʼs experiences, perceptiveness, and risk
aversionthat I have poin ted out above.
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To see this, suppose that behavior X is considered to be desirable and equally widely
observable inSocieties 1, 2, an d 3. Suppose further that members inSociety 1 are pun ished by
law if they do not exhibit X, that those in Society 2 cannot be promoted in their organizations
if they do not exhibit X, and that those in Society 3 are frowned at by their religious group
members if they do not exhibit X.
Those researchers who emphasize in ten tionintrust studies must regard people inSociety 3
as most trustworthy. However, these people are simply exhibiting X under the psychological
and social pressures of religious groups. This is an attitude where psychological and social
sanctions are feared, and it is similar to when legal or organizational sanctions are feared.
Hence, members in Society 3 cannot be claimed to be more honorable or trustworthy than those
inSocieties 1 an d 2.
All the above discussions suggest that it is impossible and improper to extract and analyze
only intention in trust studies. As my deﬁnitions of trust describe, trust is nothing but a matter
of the trusterʼs expectations, which are determined by the many factors pointed out above.
X. Conclusions
There was previously no deﬁnition of trust that could be used for economic analysis. This
paper has regarded trust as expectationor a subjective probability an d de ﬁned it using expected
utility theory together with concepts such as betrayal premium. In doing so, it has rejected the
commonly accepted black-and-white view that trustworthy people are always trustworthy and
untrustworthy people are always untrustworthy. It has been shown that this view leads to the
conclusion that studying trust is worthless. This paper has also discussed various determinants
and properties of trust on the basis of the idea that trust is not simply a matter of intention. In
particular, it has shown that regarding trust simply as a matter of intention makes trust studies
virtually impossible and excludes many interesting questions from analysis. All these
discussions suggest the importance of expressing trust as a probability.
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